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Abstract   In this study, we employ a choice-based conjoint survey design to
elicit individual choices of beach erosion control programs that can potentially
cause multiple effects on beach environment. Two empirical choice models,
which incorporate individual heterogeneity, are used to analyze and compare
the elicited individual choices of erosion control programs. Our results show
that to a typical individual, both the positive and negative impacts of the pro-
grams affect his/her choices. We find that the economic benefit of an erosion
control program to preserve a stretch of sand beach can be grossly exaggerated
if potential negative impacts on the coastal environment from the same program
are not considered. This study demonstrates feasible comparisons of beach ero-
sion control programs that account for their multiple effects, as well as the
demographics of program locations.
Key words   Beach erosion control, choice based conjoint analysis, individual
specific welfare estimates.
JEL Classification Codes   Q26, H41.
Introduction
According to the United States Army Corps of Engineers, close to half of the
beaches in the USA are experiencing significant erosion problems. Beach erosion
can be caused by a combination of human-induced development, global rising of the
sea level, occasional violent weather systems, and chronic sediment transport by
waves. Some of the negative impacts associated with beach erosion include losses
of: recreational beaches, tourist-related business, ocean front properties, land for
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aquaculture, and wildlife habitat. Government involvement in erosion control is jus-
tified due to the public goods characteristics of most coastal beaches. Various
erosion control programs/plans have been implemented in the coastal regions of the
USA. There are many erosion control methods (e.g., www.nicholas.duke.edu/psds/
Stabilization/Categories.htm), of which most have multiple effects, both positive
and negative, on the beach and surrounding environment. For example, erosion con-
trol programs that require maintenance and adjustments can restrict use of beaches
over a period of time. Some such programs require installation of visible structures
that can affect both the aesthetics of beaches and the overall experience of the beach
trip itself. Yet other erosion control methods can initiate or accelerate erosion on
neighboring beaches or affect coastal wildlife habitat. If these effects are not consid-
ered when developing erosion control programs, non-optimal program choices can
result.
The particular coastal areas studied in this paper include the states of New
Hampshire (NH) and Maine (ME). There are approximately 18 miles of coastline in
NH and about 70 miles of sand beaches in ME, located primarily in southern Maine
from York north to Cape Elizabeth. This region provides a wide variety of uses and
contributes significantly to the two states’ economic and environmental resource
base. The beach nourishment experience in these two states is relatively limited. A
summary of the beach nourishment projects in these areas from 1935 to 1996 can be
found in Haddad and Pilkey (1998). In February 1997, the Maine State Planning Of-
fice and the Maine Department of Environmental Protection established a
stakeholder’s group with the goal of developing policy recommendations essential
to the management and use of beaches in Maine. The five key issues reported by the
stakeholder’s group in their April 1998 report included: beach erosion, property at
risk, wildlife habitat, public use of beaches, and regulation of activities in sand
dunes. In order to provide cost effective management of this resource, it is crucial to
estimate both the benefits and costs associated with various management alterna-
tives. The NH/ME Sea Grant Offices presented specific future objectives in their
1996 publication “Sustaining a Sea Beside the Sea.” They acknowledged the need to
produce socioeconomic information to assist decision makers who must weigh the
impacts of various types of coastal improvement and the cost of beach protection/
restoration.
The purpose of this study is to derive welfare estimates that are adjustable ac-
cording to individual heterogeneity and the varying effects of different erosion
control programs. A mail survey of randomly selected NH and ME households is
conducted. We employ choice-based conjoint analysis and ask survey participants to
compare erosion control programs which vary according to their multiple impacts on
the beach and coastal environment. Through individuals’ choices of programs, we
investigate the perceived tradeoffs of both positive and negative effects of erosion
control programs. Two empirical choice models, namely the conditional logit and
mixed logit models, are employed to incorporate individual heterogeneity into the
program choice analysis. We confirm that preferences for erosion control programs
are indeed affected by both program attributes and household/individual characteris-
tics, as are the subsequently derived benefit estimates.
In the next section, we review previous valuation research on beach protection/
nourishment, as well as attribute-based stated choice methods for non-market valua-
tion. We then describe the survey design for valuing beach erosion control and the
data collection process. The empirical models to analyze individual choices of ero-
sion control programs and the associated welfare measures are presented, followed
by the discussion of model specification and estimation issues and the results of the
data analysis. Some concluding remarks are then presented.Beach Erosion Control 223
Valuation of Beach Erosion Control
The majority of research on beach valuation estimates recreation demand for a site
using the travel cost method and then derives the corresponding consumer surplus
measure. Some studies focus on the impact that protection-enhanced beach quality
has on property values and development in coastal areas (e.g., Parsons 1992; Cordes
and Yezer 1998; Kriesel and Friedman 2003). There are recent studies of beach rec-
reation site choices that use the random utility framework (e.g., Parsons, Massey,
and Tomasi 2000). Some studies have employed the contingent valuation method
(CVM) to estimate both the use and passive use values of beach nourishment and
protection (e.g., Silberman, Gerlowski, and Williams 1992). In the sizeable literature
on beach valuation, the potential multiple effects of erosion control methods on the
coastal environment and the associated tradeoffs are rarely emphasized. Freeman
(1995), in his review of the empirical literature on the economic value of marine
recreation, concludes that very few economic valuation studies have been done
which focus on the role of qualitative attributes of beaches. An economic valuation
of erosion control programs in terms of their multiple effects on beaches will pro-
vide policy makers with important program evaluation information.
The multiple effects of a beach erosion control program can be viewed as the
“attributes” of the erosion control program. As such, different control methods can
generate different levels of these attributes. By valuing the attributes of various ero-
sion control programs, the benefits of these programs can be estimated. This type of
analysis is common for comparing market goods in an effort to understand the
tradeoffs that consumers are willing to make with respect to a product’s attributes.
This so-called conjoint analysis has gained popularity for valuation of non-market
goods because of its intuitive applicability when comparing policy alternatives. Fur-
thermore, in 1995 the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
reissued its proposed rule for natural resource damage assessments (NRDA), which
states that the lost value and associated services are to be compensated by providing
in-kind resource services. Perceivably conjoint analysis can provide one means of
assessing the equivalence of lost and gained services to assist in NRDA work
(Mathews et al. 1995).
There are various forms of conjoint analysis (Green, Krieger, and Wind 2001).
A large number of non-market valuation applications employ the traditional conjoint
analysis survey format that derives preference ratings or the strength of preferences
for products (e.g., Mackenzie 1993; Roe, Boyle, and Teisl 1996). Alternatively, sur-
vey respondents can be asked to rank all products according to the associated
attribute levels (e.g., Garrod and Willis 1996). The more recent applications focus
on a single choice among two or more (e.g., Opaluch et al. 1993; Adamowicz,
Louviere, and Williams 1994; Blamey, Gordon, and Chapman 1999; Cameron et al.
2002). In a split sample study, Boyle et al. (2001) elicited ratings, ranks, and single
choices each from a separate random sample and found that the welfare estimates
for changes in attribute levels from these three samples are significantly different.
They concluded that the single choice format with an opt-out option (status quo)
might be preferred. In contrast to the cardinal utility assumption for ratings, the
single choice format only requires the ordinal assumption of choice preferences, and
the status quo option allows “no change” so that individuals are not forced to accept
changes that might bias the results upward. We adopt the choice-based conjoint
analysis with an opt-out option for our study. Individuals are asked to review the at-
tributes of two erosion control programs at a time and then indicate their preference
for one of these programs or the status quo (no program). Hence, for each choice
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to each survey respondent.1 This method allows multiple beach attributes induced by
erosion control programs to be evaluated as bundles. Subsequently the erosion con-
trol programs can be valued based on the estimated, combined attribute values that
they induce.
Survey Design and Data Summary
The survey instrument design was initiated with two focus group meetings con-
ducted in Londonderry (NH) and Wells (ME) in May, 2000. Based on the focus
group results, we identify eight resulting impacts of erosion control programs. Each
program can be described by the varying levels of the eight program effects on the
beach environment along with its cost to a household. The eight impact attributes
are: beach preservation, property protection, visible structure, restricted beach ac-
cess, hazards to swimmers, alteration of wildlife habitat, erosion of a neighboring
beach, and water quality deterioration. The levels of attributes designed for this
study are reported in table 1. Two attributes (beach preservation in miles and prop-
erty protection in million dollars) and the program cost to a household (in dollars)
have multiple levels. The remaining attributes are simplified to two levels (yes or
no), and empirically, these qualitative program impact attributes are coded as 1 if a
suggested erosion control program results in such impact and 0 otherwise. The pro-
gram cost to a household serves as the payment vehicle in the survey design and is
described as additional annual license plate renewal fees.2 Given the fairly large
number of attributes, it is not feasible to present all possible combinations of the
levels of attributes to survey respondents.3 Instead, an orthogonal main effect design
that investigates only the main attribute effects with no interactions is implemented
in the survey.
The questionnaire, along with a brochure describing beach erosion and erosion
control in NH and ME, was sent to a randomly selected sample of 1,200 households
(600 in NH and 600 in ME) in August 2000.4 Each potential survey respondent was
first asked to rate and then rank erosion control program characteristics in terms of
their perceived importance. The respondent was then presented with four pairs of
hypothetical erosion control programs, one pair at a time, and asked to compare
them. A sample pair of hypothetical erosion control programs used in the survey
questionnaire is given in table 2.
There were 89 undeliverable questionnaires due to incorrect mailing names and/
or addresses and 255 completed and returned questionnaires yielding an effective re-
sponse rate of 23%. Recall that each survey respondent was asked to compare four
1 Following the recommendation by the NOAA panel (Arrow et al. 1993), in addition to the three pro-
gram alternatives, the “don’t know” option was also provided in our empirical study of New Hampshire
and Maine beaches. There were, however, only a few respondents that chose the “don’t know” option,
and subsequently these observations were omitted from the data analysis.
2 Given that there is no broad-based tax structure in New Hampshire, the choices of a payment vehicle
applicable to all households are limited.
3 In the focus group meetings, we presented two sets of program comparisons. In one comparison, the
erosion control programs were described based on four impact attributes and costs. In the other, pro-
grams were described using eight attributes and costs. The focus group participants acknowledged the
difficulties of comparing programs based on eight impact attributes. However, the majority of the par-
ticipants still preferred the program description of eight attributes over four for its more thorough pre-
sentation of the actual program effects.
4 An initial introductory letter was mailed to each household within the sample, followed by the ques-
tionnaire and brochure. A reminder card was sent following the survey packet. Due to budget con-
straints, we were unable to conduct the second mailing.Beach Erosion Control 225
Table 1
Erosion Control Effects in the Choice Design
(Orthogonal Main Effect Design with Four Blocks)
Attributes of an Erosion Control Program Attribute Levels
Sand beach preservation (miles) 1, 2, 3, 4
Property protection ($million) 1, 2, 3
Annual cost to a household ($)* ($3, $7, $11, $15) × # cars in a household
Visible structure on beach Yes, No
1/1000 chance of minor injury to swimmers Yes, No
Restricted beach access and swimming area Yes, No
Disturbance to wildlife habitat (no threat of extinction) Yes, No
Erosion on neighboring beach Yes, No
Deterioration (10%) of salt water quality near beach Yes, No
* The proposed annual cost to a household is an additional license plate renewal fee times the number of
cars in the household.
5 We also tried a few other empirical choice models. The heteroskedastic extreme value model, which is
an extension of the conditional logit model with non-constant variances, produced results similar to
those for the conditional logit model, and the estimated variances were all very close to 1. The multino-
mial probit and the multinomial logit latent class models also gave similar estimates as the conditional
logit model. These models are designed to relax the assumption of independence from irrelevant alterna-
tives (IIA) embedded in the standard conditional logit model and can be formulated to incorporate indi-
vidual heterogeneity. In this paper, we present the simple conditional logit model as the baseline model
for comparison with the popular mixed logit model, which is specifically designed to derive individual
specific parameter estimates.
pairs of erosion control programs. Subtracting the missing values or “don’t know”
answers yielded an unbalanced panel data set with a total of 797 program choices.
The characteristics of respondents by state are summarized in table 3. Most of the demo-
graphic variables are comparable between the two states. The ones that differ noticeably
are the percentage living in a coastal county, average number of trips to beaches, and
mean household income. To capture the differences between the two states, these
variables will be included in the analysis of erosion control program choices.
Discrete Choice Models and Welfare Measures
We choose two empirical models to illustrate the alternative modeling strategies to
take into account individual heterogeneity in analyzing choice decisions. These
models are the conditional logit and mixed logit models. The conditional logit
model is the standard model for choice analysis. The mixed logit model is selected
because it is designed to allow preference heterogeneity across individuals, which is
the focus of this paper.5
The general log-likelihood function that represents the corresponding set of n
choice decisions can be written as follows:
Lx x x i i i i iJ iJ
i
n
=+ + + []
= ∑ 11 22
1
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able 2





1. 4 mile stretch sand beach preserved
1. 2 mile stretch sand beach preserved
2. $7 collected at each license plate renewal for beach preservation
2. $15 collected at each license plate renewal for beach preservation
3. 
T
otal $1 million worth of properties protected
3. 
T
otal $2 million worth of properties protected
4. No visible structure/device
4. 
V
isible (permanent) structure/device on beach
5. No danger to swimmers
5. Slight chance (1/1000) of minor injury to swimmers
6. No restriction on beach access
6. Restricted beach access and swimming areas
7. Disturbance to wildlife habitat (no threat of extinction)
7. No impact on wildlife habitat
8. Causing some erosion on neighboring beach
8. No causing erosion on neighboring beach
9. Slight deterioration (10%) of salt water quality near beach due
9. No impact on salt water quality near beach
    to reduced water circulation
Based on the impacts of Programs 1 and 2, which program would you prefer? (CIRCLE ONE 
ANSWER)








3. Prefer no erosion control program over Programs 1 and 2 (
i.e.
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where xij = 1 if good j is chosen by individual i, and xij = 0 otherwise; πij is the prob-
ability that individual i chooses good j. J equals the total number of choice
alternatives including J-1 erosion control programs plus the no-program option. The
conditional logit model is to assume a logistic function for πij as a function of the




























The indirect utility function, Vij, is commonly assumed to be linear in parameters
such that Vij = β′wij, where wij is a vector of explanatory variables including qij (the
product attributes), pij (the cost to consume product j), and possibly household/indi-
vidual characteristics (included through choice specific intercept terms or variable
interactions); β is a vector of variable coefficients that are usually assumed constant
across individuals and product choices.
The mixed logit model assumes that the parameters in the indirect utility func-
tion, Vij, vary randomly across individuals and can be correlated (Revelt and Train
1998). The random parameters can also be functions of variables such as individual
characteristics. Let βik be the coefficient associated with the kth explanatory variable
in Vij, which depends on individual characteristics (si) and varies randomly across i:
ββ α λ ik ik ik k k i ik us u i n k K =+=+ ′ += … = … * ,, ,, . 11    (3)
Table 3
Summary Statistics of Respondents in NH and ME
All New Hampshire Maine
NH residents 54% — —
Living in a coastal county 37% 28% 46%
Primary residence ocean front 1% 1% 2%
Living with children under 18 32% 29% 35%
Male 63% 69% 58%
Married 65% 66% 64%
College degree 51% 55% 48%
Non-white 2% 3% 1%
Retired 18% 18% 18%
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
# trips to NH/ME beaches in 1999 7.52 12.41 6.09 10.22 9.18 14.37
# trips to all beaches in 1999 8.66 13.92 7.64 13.29 9.83 14.53
Household income ($) 56,156 28,271 61,458 27,381 50,036 28,058
Household income > $84,000 0.18 0.39 0.22 0.41 0.14 0.35
Age 48.97 15.88 49.6 15.63 48.26 16.13
# Cars in the household 1.93 0.83 1.97 0.85 1.88 0.8
# Respondents 213 114 99
# Observations (# Program Choices) 797 427 370Huang, Poor, and Zhao 228
The vector of parameters λk indicates the impact of individual characteristics on βik.
The u’s are random errors with zero means. Since πij depends on βik, with the as-
sumption of normally distributed βik, the unconditional probability of πij in the
log-likelihood function of the mixed logit model is derived by integrating over βk,
k=1,...,K (Haab and McConnell 2002). The applicability of the mixed logit model is
well perceived amongst the IIA free discrete choice models for its known properties
and the availability of routine estimation procedures (McFadden and Train 2000).6
In general, individual characteristics can be incorporated as part of the model speci-
fication in all choice models, including the standard conditional logit model. For
example, choice-specific intercept terms can depend on individual characteristics.
Individual characteristics can also be interacted with choice attributes so the impact
of choice attributes is individual specific. The additional advantage of a mixed logit
model is that it also allows parameters in the model to vary with individuals.
The welfare measure for a change in a choice attribute based on a standard con-
ditional logit model, with a linear specification for the conditional indirect utility




















0 is the vector of levels of product attributes associated with the initial state,
and βp is the coefficient of pij such that –βp is the marginal utility of income. The βp
can be a function of individual characteristics. Based on the estimated conditional
utility function and the formula in equation (4), we can derive the individual benefit/
loss estimates associated with any changes in the choice (program) attributes. Note
that the formula in equation (4) can be used to compute the welfare estimate for a
change in one choice attribute for one choice alternative, or it can be used to com-
pute the welfare estimate for simultaneous changes in one (or more than one)
attribute across partial or all choice alternatives.7
In the mixed logit model, some of the βs are random. The mean welfare esti-
mate can be computed by integrating the formula in equation (4) with respect to the
random βs,  wd i ∫ () . ββ  A simulation approach of random draws from the estimated
distribution of βs is employed to compute the multiple integrals (Train 1998). As
seen, the expression in equation (4) is the core of computing the welfare estimates
for both empirical models. In the case study, we compute the willingness to pay for
preserving one mile of beach by any of the erosion control programs in the choice
set. For the qualitative choice attributes, we examine the welfare changes by setting
an impact attribute to a certain level for each program alternative. To demonstrate
the joint effects of program attributes, the overall welfare changes of some combina-
tions of attributes are also computed.
6 The random coefficients in the indirect utility functions across choice alternatives induce the correla-
tion of choice alternatives to relax the IIA assumption. However, in the standard mixed logit model, the
correlation induced by a random coefficient is the same between any of the two choice alternatives be-
cause the same random coefficient appears in all indirect utility functions associated with the choice al-
ternatives for the same individual. The induced correlation can be strict and unrealistic. Additional treat-
ments, such as including choice dummy variables, are required to allow specific correlation structure
among choices.
7 von Haefen (2003) suggests an alternative approach to welfare measurement from the multiple choice
random utility model that uses an individual’s estimated utility of the actual choice as the baseline util-
ity to derive the conditional welfare changes. The proposed welfare measure can also be computed for
either a change in quality of a particular site choice or the loss of a site.Beach Erosion Control 229
Estimation and Results
For the comparison of erosion control programs across locations, an important ele-
ment in the model specification is to allow individual heterogeneity to affect choice
decisions, and subsequently, benefit estimates. As discussed previously, individual
heterogeneity can be modeled by including variables of individual characteristics
and/or by allowing individual-specific parameters in the choice models. We first in-
teract individual characteristics with erosion control program attributes to
investigate whether the effects of program attributes are affected by individual char-
acteristics. The only attribute whose effect on choice decisions is consistently
affected by individual characteristics, especially gender and work status, is the pro-
gram cost (additional license plate renewal fee). Hence, in our basic conditional
logit model, the program cost variable is interacted with the gender and work status
dummies. In other words, we allow the marginal utility of income to vary with two
individual characteristics, which means that different scaling factors for different in-
dividuals are applied to derive monetary welfare estimates. Individual
characteristics can also impact program choices directly. For example, the choice of
erosion control program may be affected by the frequency of beach use. Avid users
might want erosion control more than casual users. High-income households are
more likely to support erosion control programs that can be costly. Those who live
in coastal counties may view erosion control differently than those who live further
away from the coast. Further, as seen in the summary statistics in table 3, these indi-
vidual characteristics differ between the two states, and including these variables
helps discern the differences between states. Hence, we present a common, basic
specification for both conditional and mixed logit models; that is, to interact the pro-
gram cost variable with gender and work status dummy variables and estimate
choice-specific intercept terms as a function of individual characteristics, including
the coastal county dummy variable, high-income level dummy variable, and fre-
quency of beach use.8
The other estimation issue is to determine random coefficients in the mixed
logit model. Technically all coefficients in the mixed logit model can be assumed
random. However, specifying a complete set of random coefficients as a function of
individual characteristics might not be estimable due to a potentially flat likelihood
function (Greene 2000; Ruud 1996).9 Allowing the coefficient of the program cost
variable to be random is especially troublesome because it is the (negative) marginal
utility of income and its value directly affects the computation of welfare measures.
It is recommended by researchers to fix the coefficient of the cost variable (e.g.,
Revelt and Train 1998; Goett, Hudson, and Train 2000) and we adopt the strategy.
We then try various subsets of random coefficients and examine the corresponding
variance estimates. We find consistently significant variance estimates for two ran-
8 Instead of actual income, we chose to use an income dummy variable to distinguish the higher income
households from the others. According to the US 2000 Census, the median household income is $37,240
in Maine and $48,928 in New Hampshire. We used the average median income in two states multiplied
by 2 to define the higher income households. There was no qualitative difference whether the actual in-
come or income dummy was used, but the model with the income dummy was more significant, and it
allowed simple comparison of WTP estimates of two income groups. We also tried two other grouping
criteria. Results were very similar. The results employing the actual income variable are available upon
request.
9 In the preliminary estimation, the full specification of the mixed logit model (assuming that all coeffi-
cients are random and are functions of individual characteristics) does not converge. Estimation difficul-
ties other than the convergence problems include determination of the plausible distribution, incorrect
signs for some observations, and unreasonably large welfare estimates when the estimated individual
specific price coefficient is close to 0.Huang, Poor, and Zhao 230
dom coefficients associated with property protection and visible structure, indicating
that survey respondents might have divergent views of these two erosion control
program attributes. Hence, we present a mixed logit model with two random (nor-
mally distributed) coefficients, property protection and visible structure. The
correlation between these two random coefficients is set to zero because it is not
significantly different from zero.10, 11
Our idea is to capture the differences between states through demographic vari-
ables and individual characteristics so that the estimation results can be applied to
choices of erosion control programs in states other than NH and ME. To examine
and test whether our empirical choice models capture the differences between the
two states, we first estimate models separately with NH and ME data; then we esti-
mate a model with the pooled data. Finally, we estimate a pooled model with a state
dummy variable. In the estimation, we set the status quo of no program as the refer-
ence choice, so the (positive) choice specific intercept terms for any erosion control
program indicate a preference of the program over no program.
The estimation results of the conditional and mixed logit models are presented
in tables 4 and 5, respectively. Each table contains four estimated models that differ
by the data sets: NH, ME, pooled, and pooled with a state dummy variable. All esti-
mated models are numbered consecutively with models 1–4 in table 4 and models
5–8 in table 5. Most of the erosion control program attributes are significant, except
for property protection in the conditional logit model and the presence of a visible
structure in both empirical models. (The swim hazard attribute is insignificant for
the NH data.) The coefficients of the property protection and visible structure at-
tributes are assumed random with a normal distribution in the mixed logit model,
and the standard errors of the two random coefficients are significant (table 5). In
the focus group meetings, we found property protection to rank low on the priority
of erosion control by most participants, even though it is one of the key aspects con-
sidered by policy makers to control beach erosion. Some people do not like to see
erosion control related devices on beaches, yet some visible structures, such as jet-
ties, can actually be appealing to certain beach goers such as fishermen. The
significant randomness of these two coefficients in the mixed logit model seems to
match with our observation of a wide range of opinions regarding these two at-
tributes of erosion control.
The potential negative aspects of an erosion control program, such as impact on
wildlife habitat, erosion of a neighboring beach, and deterioration of water quality,
play important roles in the choice decisions. Further, the constant marginal utility of
income in general is rejected in both conditional logit and mixed logit models, since
the overall program cost coefficient (βp) varies significantly with male and/or retire
dummy variables (male=1 if male; retire=1 if retired). The marginal utility of in-
come is larger for a male and/or a retiree. The NH high-income households tend to
support erosion control regardless of the impacts to the beach environment. Trip fre-
quency does not significantly impact program choices. Those who visit beaches
more frequently are not more likely to choose to control erosion. Those who live in
coastal counties tend not to support erosion control programs—the sentiment also
10 Other rules for reducing the number of random coefficients in the estimation were attempted. The
qualitative results of most coefficients were very stable with expected signs, regardless of the model
specification. Certain coefficients (wildlife habitat and erosion of a neighboring beach) became insig-
nificant when their coefficients were assumed random. We also tried the random intercepts models to
mimic the random effects models, but the estimation did not always converge and the standard devia-
tions for the random intercepts were often insignificant.
11 As shown in Train (1999), the estimation time of mixed logit models can be significantly shortened by
Halton draws. We employ 150 Halton draws instead of regular random draws in the estimation.Beach Erosion Control 231
Table 4
Conditional Logit Models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
NH ME Pooled Pooled
Program Cost to a Household (Unit: $)a
αp –0.006 –0.036*** –0.018*** –0.018***
(0.010)b (0.011) (0.007) (0.007)
MALE –0.047*** –0.008 –0.027*** –0.028***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008)
RETIRE –0.023 –0.082*** –0.044*** –0.044***
(0.016) (0.022) (0.013) (0.013)
Beach Preservation 0.154** 0.244*** 0.197*** 0.198***
(Unit: mile) (0.071) (0.078) (0.051) (0.051)
Property Protection –0.070 –0.130 –0.091 –0.090
(Unit: $million) (0.092) (0.102) (0.067) (0.067)
Visible Device on Beach 0.141 –0.182 0.009 0.012
(Yes=1) (0.134) (0.148) (0.095) (0.095)
1/1000 Chance Swim Hazard –0.076 –0.410*** –0.234** –0.232**
(Yes=1) (0.127) (0.140) (0.092) (0.092)
Restrict Access –0.293** –0.174 –0.240*** –0.242***
(Yes=1) (0.127) (0.143) (0.093) (0.093)
Impact on Wildlife Habitat –0.703*** –0.463*** –0.589*** –0.588***
(Yes=1) (0.132) (0.144) (0.095) (0.095)
Erosion of Neighboring Beach –0.502*** –0.400*** –0.444*** –0.448***
(Yes=1) (0.131) (0.151) (0.094) (0.095)
10% Deterioration of Water Quality –0.587*** –0.440*** –0.503*** –0.505***
(Yes=1) (0.130) (0.144) (0.094) (0.094)
Intercept1 1.932*** 2.285*** 1.986*** 1.846***
(0.378) (0.450) (0.284) (0.308)
Intercept1_Coastal County –0.154 –0.823*** –0.605*** –0.551**
(0.338) (0.311) (0.216) (0.221)
Intercept1_High Income 0.913** –0.212 0.566** 0.516*
(0.421) (0.437) (0.287) (0.290)
Intercept1_# Total Beach Trips 0.009 0.005 0.010 0.011
(0.013) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008)
Intercept1_NH Dummy Variable 0.244
(0.208)
Intercept2 1.955*** 2.133*** 1.943*** 1.774***
(0.343) (0.417) (0.259) (0.283)
Intercept2_Coastal County –0.417 –0.921*** –0.744*** –0.681***
(0.338) (0.310) (0.215) (0.219)
Intercept2_High Income 1.270*** 0.312 0.933*** 0.876***
(0.414) (0.411) (0.280) (0.281)
Intercept2_# Total Beach Trips 0.005 0.012 0.007 0.008
(0.014) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008)
Intercept2_NH Dummy Variable 0.294
(0.206)
Log–Likelihood –376.107 –338.475 –729.461 –728.352
McFadden’s R2 0.161 0.154 0.142 0.143
LR test stat for data pooling 29.758*
a The overall coefficient of the program cost variable is β p = αp + λ1 * MALE + λ2 * RETIRE.
b Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, re-
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Table 5
Mixed Logit Models
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
NH ME Pooled Pooled
Program Cost to a Household (Unit: $)a
αp –0.021 –0.045*** –0.031*** –0.031***
(0.014)b (0.016) (0.010) (0.010)
MALE –0.057*** –0.004 –0.032*** –0.032***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.012) (0.012)
RETIRE 0.012 –0.092** –0.026 –0.027
(0.026) (0.037) (0.020) (0.020)
Beach Preservation 0.267*** 0.390*** 0.327*** 0.328***
(Unit: mile) (0.098) (0.105) (0.070) (0.070)
Property Protection –0.337* –0.531** –0.421*** –0.419***
(Unit: $million) (0.178) (0.209) (0.134) (0.134)
Visible Device on Beach 0.185 –0.209 0.011 0.018
(Yes=1) (0.204) (0.194) (0.135) (0.135)
1/1000 Chance Swim Hazard –0.180 –0.439** –0.320*** –0.317***
(Yes=1) (0.168) (0.186) (0.122) (0.122)
Restrict Access –0.431** –0.274 –0.368*** –0.369***
(Yes=1) (0.170) (0.184) (0.122) (0.122)
Impact on Wildlife Habitat –0.905*** –0.550*** –0.736*** –0.737***
(Yes=1) (0.174) (0.178) (0.121) (0.121)
Erosion of Neighboring Beach –0.641*** –0.438** –0.546*** –0.550***
(Yes=1) (0.201) (0.191) (0.135) (0.135)
10% Deterioration of Water Quality –0.924*** –0.630*** –0.752*** –0.750***
(Yes=1) (0.210) (0.193) (0.138) (0.138)
Intercept1 3.495*** 3.981*** 3.577*** 3.470***
(0.600) (0.706) (0.443) (0.518)
Intercept1_Coastal County 0.372 –1.014 –0.403 –0.361
(0.673) (0.630) (0.435) (0.446)
Intercept1_High Income 1.290* –0.606 0.810 0.774
(0.766) (0.910) (0.566) (0.573)
Intercept1_# Total Beach Trips 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.007
(0.028) (0.022) (0.016) (0.016)
Intercept1_NH Dummy Variable 0.160
(0.421)
Intercept2 3.526*** 3.901*** 3.570*** 3.411***
(0.546) (0.674) (0.411) (0.484)
Intercept2_Coastal County –0.085 –1.186* –0.662 –0.599
(0.640) (0.617) (0.415) (0.427)
Intercept2_High Income 1.997*** 0.004 1.350** 1.294**
(0.748) (0.898) (0.548) (0.554)
Intercept2_# Total Beach Trips 0.001 0.012 0.003 0.003
(0.027) (0.022) (0.016) (0.016)
Intercept2_NH Dummy Variable 0.248
(0.407)
  σHomesave 1.264*** 1.392*** 1.300*** 1.294***
(0.193) (0.232) (0.146) (0.146)
  σSeeDevice 1.119*** 0.668* 0.928*** 0.926***
(0.300) (0.390) (0.228) (0.229)
Log–Likelihood –329.461 –292.505 –636.492 –636.287
McFadden’s R2 0.265 0.269 0.251 0.252
LR test stat for data pooling 29.052
a The overall coefficient of the program cost variable is β p = αp + λ1 * MALE + λ2 * RETIRE.
b Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, re-
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found in the focus group participants who live near the coast but not on the coast.
The significant (except for the NH data), positive choice specific intercept terms in-
dicate that, on average, any erosion control is preferred over the status quo of no
erosion control regardless of its impact on the beach environment.12
We conduct likelihood ratio (LR) tests for data pooling based on models 1, 2,
and 3 in table 4, and models 5, 6, and 7 in table 5. The LR test statistics are 29.7
based on the conditional logit models and 29.1 based on the mixed logit models, re-
spectively. Data pooling is rejected at α = 0.1, but it cannot be rejected at α = 0.05
for the conditional logit models [χ2
19,0.1 = 27.2, χ2
19,0.5 = 30.1]; and data pooling can-
not be rejected for the mixed logit models [χ2
21,0.1 = 29.6, χ2
21,0.05 = 32.7]. Further,
the NH state dummy variable is insignificant in both conditional and mixed logit
models (models 4 and 8). The test results lend support to the specification of the em-
pirical models for deriving welfare estimates that can be adjusted according to
individual characteristics and choice attributes, regardless of state. The demographic
variables included in the empirical models seem to capture most of the differences
between the two states. Hence, in the welfare analysis, we present the mean ben-
efits/losses of erosion control program attributes based only on the pooled models 3
and 7. We also present the welfare estimates by individual characteristics based on
the same pooled models to show the impact of individual heterogeneity on welfare
measurement. Welfare estimates based on the other estimated models are available
upon request.
The mean welfare estimates for each impact attribute by state based on the
pooled models 3 and 7 are reported in table 6.13 The numbers in the parentheses are
the bootstrapped standard errors.14 The welfare estimates associated with the insig-
nificant attribute coefficients are indicated with square brackets. As seen in table 6,
the ME residents have slightly higher welfare estimates than the NH residents, but
the differences are not statistically significant. The mean welfare estimates based on
the conditional logit and mixed logit models are similar in magnitude, although the
welfare estimates based on the mixed logit models appear to be more precise with
tighter confidence intervals. In general, individuals incur large losses when an ero-
sion control program has negative impact on wildlife habitat and causes erosion of
neighboring beaches and water quality deterioration. The overall value of an erosion
control program depends on its combined effects. Note that the overall welfare
change of multiple impacts is not simply the sum of welfare changes from the indi-
vidual impacts because of the nonlinearity in the formula of welfare measure as seen
in equation (4).15 For example, suppose an erosion control program is designed to
12 Note that the magnitude of the intercepts of the two erosion control program choices is similar since
the erosion control programs are not systematically ordered in the survey. For generality, we do not re-
strict the intercept terms to be the same between two program choices in the estimation.
13 Welfare estimates of program attributes for each of the two program alternatives are computed, and
the average estimates of the two programs are reported. In the pooled models, even though parameters
are the same for the two states, the values of explanatory variables differ to result in different welfare
estimates between the two states.
14 There are different methods to derive standard errors for the welfare measures based on discrete
choice models. One method is to approximate the variance analytically by Taylor series expansion of the
welfare measure (Cameron 1991). Another method is to draw from a multivariate distribution based on
the estimated coefficients and the associated covariance matrix (Krinsky and Robb 1986). Still another
method is to bootstrap from the estimated choice probabilities and re-estimate the models. This method
is originally proposed by Duffield and Patterson (1991) for the binary choice models. The computation
of any of these methods is non-trivial, especially for the mixed logit model, because the associated wel-
fare measure must be derived via simulation. In this paper, we adopt the method by Duffield and
Patterson (1991) and extend it for the multiple choice models (Huang 1994).
15 Nevertheless, the direct sum of welfare changes from each of the multiple impacts can provide a quick
approximation for the overall value of an erosion control program with multiple impacts.Huang, Poor, and Zhao 234
T
able 6









































































































































   deterioration in salt water quality near beach

































The benefit estimates associated with insignificant coef
ficients (at the 0.1 level) are indicated with square brackets. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.Beach Erosion Control 235
preserve five miles of beach but it will cause a slight chance of injury to swimmers,
disturbance to wildlife habitat, and deterioration of water quality. Based on the mean
results of the pooled mixed logit model, this erosion control program has an esti-
mated annual value of $4.45 per household. If another potential erosion control
program preserves only one mile of beach but it will cause erosion on the neighbor-
ing beach and deterioration of water quality, then the overall value of this program
is estimated to be –$3.65 per household. In this case, the benefit of the erosion con-
trol is outweighed by its negative effects on the beach environment. In a hedonic
property value study, Kriesel and Friedman (2003) find that shoreline stabilization
can benefit ocean front property owners, but it has adverse effects on the broader
community. Our findings are consistent with theirs.
Table 7 reports the mean welfare estimates for specific groups of individuals
based on the results of the pooled conditional logit and mixed logit models 3 and 7.
The benefit estimates associated with the insignificant attribute coefficients are
again indicated with square brackets, and the bootstrapped standard errors are re-
ported in the brackets. In general, welfare estimates are lower (in absolute value) for
retirees and men, and the welfare estimates among women have larger variation. The
welfare estimates in tables 6 and 7 indicate that individuals value beach preservation
but do not like certain impacts on the beach environment caused by erosion control
programs. Benefits of beach preservation alone cannot determine the optimal choice
of erosion control programs in that the negative impacts of an erosion control pro-
gram on a beach environment can offset the positive economic values of its intrinsic
purpose.
Remarks and Future Work
We design a choice-based conjoint analysis to value beach erosion control programs
based on the effects induced by the programs, and derive empirical models to be
used to derive welfare estimates that can be adjusted according to individual charac-
teristics and choice attributes. The method can be used to evaluate any public
program or policy with multiple positive and negative effects facing different stake-
holders.
We find that to a typical individual, choices of erosion control programs are af-
fected by both the positive and negative impacts of the programs. The economic
benefit of an erosion control program to preserve a stretch of sand beach can be
grossly exaggerated without taking into account the potential negative impacts on
the coastal environment caused by the same program. The total number of all beach
trips is included as an explanatory variable in the choice models as one way to in-
vestigate the impact of frequency of beach use on the choice of erosion control
program. As seen in tables 4 and 5, the variable of total trips is not significant in all
models. We also try other specifications, and the trip frequency is consistently insig-
nificant. As a future extension, detailed information of household beach recreation
activities can be collected along with erosion control program choices so that a joint
determination of household beach recreation and erosion control program choices
can be analyzed.
This analysis shows that the qualitative results and program choices are similar
regardless of the choice of empirical model. In our application, the conditional logit
model provides similar individual specific welfare estimates as those based on the
mixed logit model. The bootstrapped confidence intervals are tighter for the welfare
estimates based on mixed logit model (table 6). Given that welfare measures are
nonlinear functions of coefficient estimators, further investigation of the small sample
properties of the welfare estimators based on these discrete choice models is needed.Huang, Poor, and Zhao 236
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Estimated benefits and costs from existing studies are sometimes used to infer
the benefits and costs for new regulations by government agencies with limited bud-
gets. A benefit transfer, as defined by Boyle and Bergstrom (1992), is the transfer of
existing estimates of non-market values to a new study that is different from the
study for which the values were originally estimated. The advantages of transferring
benefit and cost measures are apparent. However, the results of benefit transfers can
be misleading due to the quality of the existing studies, the similarity of the existing
and new studies, and the method used to transfer values. In this study, erosion con-
trol programs are evaluated through a set of identified generic impact attributes, and
the values of attributes are allowed to be correlated and vary across individual char-
acteristics. The comparison of erosion control programs to account for program
effects and the demographics of program locations is feasible, and future research to
validate and ensure the transferability is warranted.
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